Fink e la filosofia come rimemorazione di sé

Abstract

Reconstructing his first philosophical steps and his collaboration with Husserl, Fink‟s work seems to provide a model of philosophy as self-reflection and self-recollection (rememoration). In Fink’s Dissertationsschrift (1930), the presented internal movement of increasing and never-ending self-awareness represents already a characteristic feature of the description of consciousness and of the analyses of presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) and recollection (Erinnerung). These remarks allow us to put Fink’s first works in continuity with the later Sixth Cartesian Meditation. Through the intense struggle with Husserl and with the idea of phenomenology, Fink develops a deepened reflection upon its method, a “phenomenology of phenomenology”. Beyond it, the radical reflective focus of phenomenology suggests the interpretation of the philosophizing self as an empty and split subject. This new understanding of the subject and the interest for the “extreme phenomena” of subjective life marks the beginning of Fink’s autonomous philosophical elaboration.