Sul problema della Sezione “Oggettività” nella Scienza della Logica di Hegel
In: L’oggettività del pensiero. La filosofia di Hegel tra idealismo, anti-idealismo e realismo XXXVI , No. 1-4 ( 2007 )
Sezione Saggi / Articles
Abstract
There is a place in the Hegelian system where the notion of Objectivity is explicitly articulated. One entire section in the Science of Logic is entitled ‘Objectivity’, almost suggesting that that would be the appropriate place to unveil the question of the notion of objective thought. However, precisely that section, its content and its presence have always represented a problematic knot in the Hegelian logical system. The problem is two-fold: on the one hand, the categories of this section (Mechanism, Chemism and Teleology) seem to refer to the realm of the Realphilosophie, and they seem not to respect the purity of logical thought. This makes the connection between such section and the remaining Hegelian system uncertain and questionable. On the other hand, the Objectivity section does not seem to present any character which determines its logical advancement over Subjectivity. This contribution focuses on the interpretation of the origin of this section and on the logical meaning that “objectivity” has in the Logic. This paper explores the roots of the problem attempting to undo a few of its theoretical knots via a particular interpretation of the Syllogism. The underlying thesis in this analysis is in fact that the section on Objectivity originates precisely in the internal dynamics of the Syllogism. The forms of self-reflection in the Syllogism justify the presence of the section Objectivity.
In this context, Objectivity does not present itself with the characters of immediacy and externality that are normally attributed to it, but it expresses the result of the syllogistic process. The second fundamental aspect of this short analysis is that Mechanism, Chemism and Teleology as categories are not directly exported from the Realphilosophie. They are rather organizational forms in the relationships among concepts. Thus, they don’t figure as abstractions from the proper structures of nature and spirit. Rather, they express the relational structures reached by thought once the syllogism has been able to manifest a yet occult rational capacity of thought.