Struttura e significato metacategoriale della soggettività nella logica di Hegel

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to clarify the meaning of the concept of subjectivity in Hegel’s ‘Science of Logic’. I put forward the theory that Hegel’s idea of subjectivity differs in a significant way from modern subjectivism and from transcendental philosophy, and has rather to be seen as a logical relationship marked by self-reflection, which for Hegel is also the conceptual structure of freedom. The analysis moves from Hegel’s critique of the Reflexionsphilosophien in Jena and focuses on different forms of reflection both in the ‘Objective Logic’ and in the ‘Subjective Logic’, to show that this particular relationship is found not only in the sections which expressively deal with subjectivity, but in the ‘Science of Logic’ as a whole.