Pensiero oggettivo e linguaggio


This paper analyzes the connection between Hegel’s theory of objective thinking and language. The current interpretative trend considers the conceptual only in a formal and propositional manner and it understands the Hegelian theory of truth in the light of semantic inferentialism. In contrast with this interpretative trend, the paper argues for two claims. 1) Hegel’s notion of concept (Begriff) does not overlap with the structure of the proposition. 2) Language plays an essential and systematic role in Hegel’s philosophy, but language can not be understood as the highest form of rational understanding. As for the Hegelian theory of truth, the paper criticizes the disjunction between the logical-formal perspective and the ontological perspective. For Hegel, the concept defines the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. The correlated ontological monism represents, on the one hand, a critique of Kant’s cognitive dualism. On the other hand, Hegel’s ontological monism provides a theory of truth which constitutes an immanent criticism of the knowledge forms of the consciousness (Bewusstsein). From this point of view, language as well as the “social practice” of giving and asking for reasons show their onesidedness, because they still constitute a “subjective” sphere of knowledge.