Normatività, spirito, libertà. A partire da Hegel

Abstract

The starting point of this paper is the convinction that normativity is a notion through which we can fruitfully interrogate Hegel’s thought from the background of questions of the contemporary debate on naturalism. The thesis I want to argue for is that a material normativity can be found in Hegel’s philosophy. This normativity is not reducible to intra-mental relations, such as inferential or semantic relationships, or relations between an abstract concept or model and his object. In Hegel’s philosophy there is an ontological side of normativity that provides an anchor in the world to the activity of thought. In Hegel’s perspective, there is a material link between the normativity of thought and objective world. This link highlights the difference between Hegel’s way of considering thinking activity and the formalistic conception of thought. Hegel conceives of thought as an activity that regulates and determines itself by itself in thinking the otherness of the object, that is responding to its normative demands. This self-determining and self-regulating capacity of thought is its freedom. Therefore, if it is possible to acknowledge a social ground of reason and normativity, this self regulating and self determining capacity of thought in responding to the normative demands of the world can be seen as Hegel’s strategy to solve the problem of cultural and social relativism of the conceptual schemes.