Evaluations are No Propositions: A Reply to Kantian Nonconceptualists Concerning the Critical Theory of Taste

Di Mahyar Moradi

In: Verifiche, Anno LI, N. 1-2, 2022 LI , No. 1-2 ( 2022 )

Sezione Discussioni / Discussions


In the recent debate on the nature of Kantian ‘content of cognition’, some scholars argue that Kantian judgments of taste bear a nonconceptual mental content because these judgments lack any conceptual determining functions of some kind. In this article, I challenge the latter standpoint for the very simple reason that judgments of taste are no propositions, but rather formative evaluations. This implies as well the fact that we are initially in possession of no aesthetic representation. Hence, neither propositionally nor non-propositionally is an aesthetic representation eligible to be counted as mental content. Instead, as the representation of the beautiful just contents oneself with itself, it refers to its objects relationally, yet not representationally in the full-fledged sense. Regarding the properties of objects, it remains consequently always ineffectively monotonous. On the occasion of agreement of the relevant cognitive faculties, we may, however, count the representation of the beautiful as phenomenal content.