Antinomia e contraddizione, tra parvenza e riflessione: la critica hegeliana a Kant intorno ai compiti della ragione

Abstract

The present article aims at investigating Hegel’s critique of Kant’s configuration of pure reason. I will especially focus on the concepts of antinomy and transcendental appearance, and I will also analyze how Hegel and Kant define reason. First, I will present Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s antinomies, as it appears in the Doctrine of the Being of the Science of Logic, by showing their disparity of views about the tasks of reason. Secondly, I will analyze the meaning of transcendental appearance in the Critique of Pure Reason, and highlight its weaknesses from the Hegelian point of view. Thirdly, I will comment on certain passages in the Doctrine of Essence, in which Hegel proposes a solution to the previously criticized problems by using one of his most powerful speculative devices, namely, reflection. Finally, I will try to explain in what sense Kant and Hegel have two incompatible approaches to the meaning and function of reason, and how they have a different idea about the tasks of philosophy.