Universale concreto e libertà. Sull’irriducibilità della libertà speculativa hegeliana alla libertà sociale

Abstract

The Hegelian concept of concrete universal is connected to his conception of speculative freedom. In contemporary social and political philosophy this notion has recently been reformulated in terms of social freedom. This paper aims to engage with Axel Honneth’s attempt to revive Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in order to show the irreducibility of speculative freedom to social freedom. What Honneth’s interpretation fails to grasp is the link that Hegel establishes between freedom and the notion of concrete universal that emerges from the Science of Logic. In arguing for the inadequacy of Honneth’s reading of the Philosophy of Right, we don’t aim to focus only on the field of Hegelian philology, but also to highlight the limits of his critical proposal. Overcoming these aporias would be possible by a more consistent return to Hegel’s philosophy.