Not Non-Metaphysical, but just as much Metaphysical. Pippin’s Hegel and the Status of Subjectivity

Abstract

I consider two claims on the status of human subjectivity that Robert Pippin combines in his re-examination of Hegel. One is the claim that human subjectivity (along with agency and freedom) is a historically achieved status conferred by social recognition. The other is the claim that there is a logical argument that proves the indispensability of a teleological, indeed intentional, and non-naturalistic description of self-conscious human beings and actions. The first contains, arguably, a non-metaphysical view. The second, however, implies a metaphysical conception. Though the unification of opposites is not unwelcome in a Hegel interpretation, I argue that in this case the resulting tension is not properly solved in Pippin’s terms. Therefore, I advocate a different approach to the metaphysical argument for subjectivity in the Science of Logic as wholesale cure for the coherence problems that affect Pippin’s reading.