L’ambiguità dell’apparire nel pensiero di Jan Patočka: tre problemi

Abstract

This article aims at presenting one of the main themes that characterize Jan Patočka’s philosophy: the appearing as such. Specifically, this paper focuses on three questions: what (was) appears? How (wie) the world appears? What is the hidden reason (Grund) that grounds appearing, but that remains hidden? The Czech philosopher introduces a conception of phenomenality according to which appearance can only be conceived through an a priori structure. This conception leads to a formal transcendentalism of appearing, on the basis of which appearing can only be thought, but not shown. The formal character of Patočka’s approach, however, follows his speculative method. Nevertheless, this speculative method is problematic: on the one hand, the structure of appearing is only accountable for its own laws (and not for what appears); on the other hand, Patočka states that the phenomenal sphere has also a practical and vital function. I will explain how he approaches this issue, and I will present both his analyses and the problems he runs into. Although Patocka seems to hold more than he can prove (e.g. he neglects to define appearing in terms of exepriencing), he offers valid suggestions concerning how we can think of major – and ongoing – phenomenological debates anew.