La negazione: dal rifiuto al contrasto. Brentano e Husserl sul giudizio negativo

Abstract

Phenomenology tries to uncover the pre-linguistic foundation of logical operators, in order to show how our logical thinking is grounded in reality, and does not have a merely psychological value. If negation is grounded in the pre-predicative experience, though, it seems to follow that reality somehow contains something negative. It has been in order to avoid such consequence that Brentano has promoted a reform of ‘classical’ logic, which, among others, avoids negative terms. Husserl answered to such a reform with a partial counter-reform that preserves a more classical understanding of logic. His logical and phenomenological investigations recognize the logical value of negation as such. However, such a recognition does not imply an ontological, or better ‘meontological’, commitment. This is possible precisely thanks to a more carefully phenomenological description of the formation and the structure of negative judgments.