Hobbesianism and Jacobinism: Two Sides of Hegel’s Critique of the Contract Theory

Abstract

In the article I examine and compare two different sides of Hegel’s critique of the modern contract theory. The first one encompasses Hegel’s critique of Hobbes’ Leviathan, while the other includes the contractarianism of Jacobinism, which, according to Hegel, had Rousseau’s The Social Contract for its theoretical background. As I will show, Hegel regards both the Leviathan and Jacobinism as a misguided attempt to found the state on the arbitrariness of the subjective will. In the first place, I argue that both of Hegel’s critiques rest on his sharp distinction between civil society and the state. However, in his criticism of Hobbes and Jacobinism Hegel reveals two different approaches. The former type of contractarianism results in a contingent union of individual wills presided over by transcended political authority that secures property and alleviates the natural fear of death, the latter is characterized by an attempt of the subjective will to lay claim to political authority itself, resulting in the exacerbation of mistrust and fear among individual wills. I show that, based on this critique, Hegel turns to Roman antiquity, and specifically to Roman virtue of ‘courage’, which is conceived of as an alternative foundation of state sovereignty. The background for this interpretation is Hegel’s requirement to locate forms of trust that can serve as the basis of a political union and would not be reducible to a contract.