Dal concetto all’esperienza. L’universale concreto in Bradley e nel primo idealismo britannico (1865-1893)

Abstract

The notion of ‘concrete universal’ is crucial to both the theoretical and the practical philosophy of British idealism. In this essay, I will deal with the concrete universal in the early British idealists (1865-1883) and in F.H. Bradley’s logic and metaphysics (1883-1893), leaving aside the more practical features of this notion, mostly related to Bosanquet’s philosophy. My aim is twofold. First, I intend to show that the concrete universal continues to be prominent in Bradley’s thought even after the publication of his only theoretical work which deals with it specifically (The Principles of Logic), that is, also in his major work (Appearance and Reality), despite the virtual absence of explicit occurrences. Second, I intend to show that, in Bradley’s thought, the idealistic and Hegelian philosophical heritage, considered here through the lens of the concrete universal, undergoes a significant shift – from ‘concept’ to ‘experience’ – that would have a notable impact on early twentieth-century philosophy. Investigating Bradley’s thought from this perspective, then, allows us to appreciate its richness and complexity from a unique angle, from which we can also better discern the actual philosophical debts that British idealists owed to Hegel.