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and Giovanna Miolli

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FEMINIST METAPHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION

by Valentina Bortolami and Giovanna Miolli*

Abstract. *This introduction aims to problematize the relationship between metaphilosophy and what we call the 'feminist philosophical project'. We define 'feminist metaphilosophy' as an internally differentiated project of critique and revolution of philosophy that has an anti-oppressive and radical transformative purpose. We further identify four main aspects of the feminist metaphilosophical contribution to philosophy.*

Keywords. *Metaphilosophy; Feminist Philosophy; Feminist Philosophical Project; Resistant Knowledge Project; Anti-oppressive Project*

1. *Metaphilosophy and Feminist Philosophy*

Critical self-reflection is an essential part of philosophy. Since relatively recent times, this activity has acquired an autonomous status to the point of being institutionalized as a subdiscipline of philosophy with its inventory of reference topics, internal disputes, and specialized journals. 'Metaphilosophy' (or 'the philosophy of philosophy'¹) indicates today a specific philosophical branch aimed

* The authors are cited alphabetically. This introduction is the result of the collaboration between the two authors, who jointly share responsibility for it. Giovanna Miolli has written sections 1 and 3, and Valentina Bortolami section 2. Section 4 has been co-written.

¹ See T. Williamson, *The Philosophy of Philosophy*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2007. It should be emphasized that Williamson rejects «the word 'metaphilosophy'» for the reason that it «sounds as though it might try to look down on philosophy from above, or beyond» (ivi, p. ix). In contrast, the expression 'philosophy of philosophy' clearly states that it is «automatically part of philosophy, just as the philosophy of anything else is» (*ibidem*). Williamson's distinction primarily makes sense because the very status of metaphilosophy has been controversial in the past and metaphilosophical inquiry has not always been considered as an activity

at investigating the nature of philosophy. Major themes include philosophy's aims, mission, methods, and objects, as well as philosophy's relation to other disciplines and society, broadly understood.

As a consequence of the composite and layered process that has singled out the metaphilosophical aspect of philosophy as a distinct field of inquiry, we can now speak of *explicit* metaphilosophy². *Implicit* metaphilosophy, in contrast, identifies a set of metaphilosophical aspects, implied in various philosophical positions, which are relevant to the mission and nature of philosophy but that have not always been explicitly thematized³. The distinction between explicit and implicit metaphilosophy has more of an operational meaning than a definitive one. Metaphilosophical concerns have been expressed throughout the history of philosophy,

within philosophy (on this, see G. Miolli, *Hegel e metafilosofia: mappa di un problema*, «Verifiche», XLVI (1), 2017, pp. 83-128, especially pp. 97-104). Currently, there is a general consensus in recognizing that metaphilosophy is 'automatically part of philosophy', and authors such as Nicholas Rescher and others take the terms 'metaphilosophy' and 'philosophy of philosophy' as synonyms to indicate «the philosophical examination of the practice of philosophizing itself» (Rescher, *Philosophical Dialectics: An Essay on Metaphilosophy*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2006, p. 1; see also Id., *Metaphilosophy: Philosophy in Philosophical Perspective*, London, Lexington Books, 2014, p. xi; and S. Overgaard, P. Gilbert, and S. Burwood, *An Introduction to Metaphilosophy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 8, 10). In this introduction, we understand metaphilosophy as an inquiry that is itself philosophical.

² The emergence and establishment of a «larger self-detached [metaphilosophical] perspective» (N. Rescher, *Metaphilosophy: Philosophy in Philosophical Perspective*, London, Lexington Books, 2014, p. xi) is neither historically nor philosophically neutral. Rather, it is symptomatic of specific demands in the twentieth century's multifaceted philosophical reflection as well as specific academic-philosophical contexts and geographical areas. For a deeper analysis of the emergence of metaphilosophy as a subdiscipline, see G. Miolli, *Hegel e metafilosofia: mappa di un problema*, and L. Illetterati and G. Miolli, *Why Hegel's Metaphilosophy Matters: An Introduction*, in L. Illetterati, G. Miolli (eds.), *The Relevance of Hegel's Concept of Philosophy: From Classical German Philosophy to Contemporary Metaphilosophy*, London-New York, Bloomsbury, (forthcoming January 2022), pp. 1-14, especially pp. 2-8.

³ See N. Joll, *Metaphilosophy*, «Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy», 2017 (<http://www.iep.utm.edu/con-meta/>, first published 17/11/2010, last revised 01/08/2017, section 1.c).

and for some authors, such as Plato, Kant⁴, Hegel, Heidegger or Wittgenstein, they have proved to be so central that it would be limiting to speak only of an ‘implicit’ metaphilosophy. The difficulty of drawing a clear line of demarcation between the two aspects highlights the plastic nature of metaphilosophical reflection. On one hand, this reflection can be identified and circumscribed within a disciplinary discourse; on the other, however, it is an all-pervasive endeavor: «*All* philosophizing is somewhat metaphilosophical, at least in this sense: any philosophical view or orientation commits its holder to a metaphilosophy that accommodates it»⁵.

The pervading presence of the metaphilosophical investigation also implies that the debates of explicit metaphilosophy do not (and cannot possibly) encompass the totality of what is thought and proposed at the metaphilosophical level. Said otherwise, many philosophical projects that have great «implications for the task or nature of philosophy»⁶ are still little addressed within the debates of explicit metaphilosophy. Feminist philosophies belong to this place of low visibility. Explicit metaphilosophy is not completely blind to these perspectives⁷, but their metaphilosophical scope is still underexplored. This special issue represents an attempt to focus explicitly on the metaphilosophical value of the feminist philosophical project⁸.

⁴ See M. Lewin, *Kant's Metaphilosophy*, «Open Philosophy», IV (1), 2021, pp. 292-310.

⁵ Joll, *Metaphilosophy*, section 1.c.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ See for example: the issue of «Metaphilosophy», X (1), 1979, which includes Sandra G. Harding's *The Social Function of the Empiricist Conception of Mind*, Genevieve Lloyd's *The Man of Reason*, and Sheila Ruth's *Methodocracy, Misogyny, and Bad Faith: Sexism in the Philosophic Establishment*; the *Symposium: Feminist Epistemology* in the journal «Metaphilosophy», XXVI (3), 1995, pp. 177-200, with contributions by N. Scheman and L.M. Antony; the Special Issue *Contributions and Controversy in Feminist Philosophy*, «Metaphilosophy», XXVII (1-2), 1996, edited by K. Wallace and M. Cantor Miller; the *Symposium on Serene J. Khader's Decolonizing Universalism*, «Metaphilosophy», LII (1), 2021, pp. 92-165, which contains contributions by S.J. Khader, M.A. McLaren, D.T. Meyers and P. Monque.

⁸ We will clarify our use of the expression ‘feminist philosophical project’ below.

Two convictions have especially inspired this volume. First, feminist philosophy (in all its ramifications) is not a *local* development of philosophy, or a subdiscipline of it, but is constitutively metaphilosophical. It extends to all philosophy. This entails recognizing that «philosophers who are feminists have, in their work in traditional fields of study, begun to change those very fields»⁹. Feminist thinking has functioned as a metaphilosophical approach that invests all philosophical areas, thus strongly impinging on the way philosophy is conceived and practiced.

The second conviction pertains to the *prescriptive* dimension of metaphilosophy¹⁰, which invites normative answers to questions such as ‘What *should* philosophy be?’, ‘How *should* philosophy proceed?’, ‘Why should we pursue philosophy? What are its role and value?’. The discussion around normative-prescriptive outlooks brings out (meta)philosophy’s critical and transformative potential, disclosing its capacity to forge new conceptual tools, uncover undeclared presuppositions, and question current situations and conditions. With few exceptions, feminist philosophies, which robustly integrate theoretical analysis and refinement of concepts with activist, transformational work, have received little attention within contemporary metaphilosophical debates. This volume makes the point that the visionary, yet utterly concrete, metaphilosophical power of the feminist philosophical project can help philosophy reimagine itself and the world (or worlds). Feminist thought has done and continues to do important work in proposing new ways of conceiving and doing philosophy, combining sophisticated critique with imagination and joy.

2. *The Feminist Philosophical Project*

Although it is probably impossible – and undesirable – to exhaustively define feminist philosophy in a few sentences, we

⁹ N. McAfee, *Feminist Philosophy*, «The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy» (Fall 2018 Edition), ed. by E.N. Zalta, URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/feminist-philosophy/>>, section 4.

¹⁰ See especially S. Overgaard, P. Gilbert and S. Burwood, *An Introduction to Metaphilosophy*, and N. Rescher, *Metaphilosophy*.

propose a provisional definition, and some critical observations around it, to explore the idea that *feminist philosophy is constitutively metaphilosophical and that it extends to all philosophy*.

Defining what feminism is, what feminist philosophy is, or what feminist theory is, are very complex undertakings that can be declined in many different ways. This is due to the many ways that feminist struggles are carried out in the world and to the many theoretical elaborations that feminists have developed around these struggles. To account for this heterogeneity, it would be more precise to speak of *feminisms* and *feminist philosophies*. In this introduction, we have chosen to use the expression *feminist philosophical project*. With a necessary dose of approximation, we indicate here a diverse, and somehow ambivalent, corpus. In other words, we use feminist philosophical project as a broad and inclusive category (i.e., a *lumping* category rather than a *splitting* concept¹¹), which comprises two aspects of feminist philosophy that may be analytically distinguishable but are often intimately intertwined in practice: feminist philosophy as an *academic discipline* and feminist philosophy as a *resistant knowledge project*¹². By feminist philosophical project, we refer to a specific instantiation of feminist theory, that is, contemporary Western feminist philosophy. This is the case in many definitions of feminist philosophy (including the one given by the «Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy»), which identify it by referring to the field of theoretical elaboration that has been established within academic philosophy since the 1970s, and which has since produced a vast body of work on a variety of topics. Indeed, although feminist philosophy has often started from questions related to the dimension of gender, sex, and sexuality, it has come to discuss topics that go beyond these issues, ultimately reconsidering fundamental questions of Western thought (e.g., the relationship between nature and culture, the relationship between body and mind). Academic feminist philosophy has contributed

¹¹ E. Zerubavel, *Lumping and Splitting: Notes on Social Classification*, «Sociological Forum», Special Issue: *Lumping and Splitting*, XI (3), 1996, pp. 421-433.

¹² P. Hill Collins, *Intersectionality as Critical Social Theory*, Durham, Duke University Press, 2019.

enormously to the advancement of contemporary philosophy, so much so that today many feminist philosophers are regarded as leading figures even by scholars who do not engage in feminist research. However, considering feminist philosophy only along the lines described above (i.e., as an *academic discipline*) may preclude a meaningful account of the philosophical and metaphilosophical scope of this project. To accurately characterize feminist philosophy, it is necessary to refuse the implication that it is merely the result of women's increased access to philosophy *plus* the application of earlier philosophical methodologies to issues of supposed feminist interest. Although these factors have certainly been fundamental to the development of the discipline, feminist philosophy is not limited to this domain.

In the widest sense, we understand feminist philosophy as the philosophical inquiry aimed at ending sexist oppression, thus joining other theoretical projects which pursue anti-oppressive, liberating objectives¹³. In this sense, feminist philosophy is part of a broad theoretical effort that has included, historically, anti-racist, decolonial, anti-speciesist, and anti-capitalist elaborations. This is not to say that feminist philosophy has always been able to effectively incorporate these tensions and maintain their implications (although, at least in some cases, it has succeeded in doing so). Rather, we propose that feminist philosophy belongs to that area of knowledge that Rosi Braidotti defines '*Studies*'¹⁴ and Patricia Hill Collins designates '*resistant knowledge projects*' in reference to her concept of '*intellectual resistance*'. This 'collocation' of feminist philosophy is one of the reasons why it should not be taken as a specific variation or a local realization of philosophy. It is not a '*philosophy of feminism*' as is the case with the philosophy of

¹³ A beautiful account of this can be found in bell hooks' book *Feminist Theory*: «Feminism is the struggle to end sexist oppression. Its aim is not to benefit solely any specific group of women, any particular race or class of women. It does not privilege women over men. It has the power to transform in a meaningful way all our lives», in bell hooks, *Feminist Theory. From Margin to Center*, Boston, South End Press, 1984, p. 26.

¹⁴ R. Braidotti, *Posthuman Knowledge*, Cambridge (UK)-Malden (MA), Polity, 2019, see Chapter 4 in particular.

biology, music or cinema. Rather, it is a branch (that in some places, such as the US, is now academized) of a theoretical work strongly linked to, if not founded on, an anti-oppressive, liberatory inspiration.

This allows us to elaborate on a point made above, namely the denial that feminist philosophy can be construed as ‘women’s increased access to philosophy *plus* the application of earlier philosophical methodologies to issues of supposed feminist interest’. Just as a philosophy of biology is not biology itself, cinema is not cinematography (although it is interested in cinema), or the philosophy of music is not musical (although its object is music), there may exist a philosophy that is more interested in the themes and concepts of feminism than in *practicing a feminist methodology* in the philosophical field. Similarly, it is possible (at least theoretically) to produce a history of women or a history of gender literature without these works being feminist per se. Circumscribing the interest of one’s research to topics such as gender or sexuality, while emerging from (at the very least) mildly feminist intentions, does not in any way guarantee that the epistemology and the methodology of the research will be feminist.

This is neither to justify nor to establish a gatekeeper position – the risk of doing so is to divide the world between those who express ‘true feminism’ and those who express ‘false feminism’ – but to emphasize the *metaphilosophical dimension* of feminist philosophy.

The anti-oppressive motivation of the feminist philosophical project not only influences its topics but also the methods of inquiry it adopts¹⁵. In this sense, it is profoundly metaphilosophical, in that it constantly questions its own methodology and its relationship with other disciplines and the world.

¹⁵ In this respect, debates centered on how to develop an intersectional approach are particularly relevant and exemplary of the kind of methodological effort required by anti-oppressive studies. For intersectionality, see for example Collins’ book *Intersectionality as Critical Social Theory*. The same also applies to many other resistant knowledge projects: queer theory, decolonial studies, posthumanities, etc.

The idea is that the feminist philosophical project has theoretical, epistemological, and methodological foundations in its feminist, ‘resistant’, anti-oppressive traditions. Of course, these foundations can be challenged, especially through theoretical, epistemological, and methodological discussions within this ‘resistant knowledge’ area. In founding itself, feminist philosophy (as opposed to a ‘philosophy of feminism’) has as its interlocutor this area of knowledge at least as much as previous philosophical traditions. In this sense, feminist philosophy demands of philosophy a re-discussion, a redefinition, and a revolution not only in terms of themes but also of methodology and the status of the discipline itself. Therefore, considering the metaphilosophical aspects of feminist philosophy allows us to account for its political dimension, which cannot be underestimated precisely because it calls into question one of the *raison d’être* of feminism. One of the pillars of feminism is the insistence on addressing *the material conditions that constitute the oppression of women and other marginalized groups*. Any discourse on feminism within the academy must necessarily deal with these conditions. The issues of *appropriation, under-representation, and the material conditions of oppression* are ineliminable from the theoretical horizon of feminists and cannot be sidelined in favor of philosophy’s methodological or scientific issues.

3. *The Metaphilosophical Contribution of the Feminist Philosophical Project*

Just as it would be inaccurate to speak of feminist philosophy in the singular, it would be inappropriate to talk about a monolithic feminist conception of philosophy, that is, of a ‘feminist metaphilosophy’. Again, we use this expression as a lumping category that has more of a pragmatic value than the status of a normative definition. By ‘feminist metaphilosophy’ we refer to an internally differentiated project of critique and revolution¹⁶ of

¹⁶ By the term ‘revolution’ we mean a radical questioning and progressive transformation of the philosophical canon and key concepts of the Western philosophical tradition, along with the work of radical transformation of the *practices* through which philosophy (including philosophy as an academic

philosophy that started with, but is not confined to, an interrogation of the influence of gender, sex, and sexuality on social arrangements and knowledge production and legitimation (including *philosophical* knowledge production and legitimation). This project has an *anti-oppressive* and radical *transformative* purpose.

We shall clarify how such an anti-oppressive dimension is constitutive of feminist *metaphilosophy* (i.e., of feminist philosophical investigation of philosophy, or, borrowing Williamson's terminology, feminist 'philosophy of philosophy'). As a project of examination and reinvention of philosophy, feminist metaphilosophy (like feminist philosophy)¹⁷ constitutively incorporates the intent to ameliorate the conditions of oppressed and marginalized groups, and, through this, of society at large. This means that feminist critical discussion of philosophical traditions, concepts, and practices, as well as of philosophy as a discipline – in short, feminist philosophical investigation of philosophy – never represents analysis for its own sake nor is it limited (or limitable) to philosophy as a disciplinary field of study. Rather, it «always involves a commitment to bringing» systems of oppression, in their various forms and intersections, «to an end»¹⁸. This struggle against oppression

discipline) is constituted. This revolution also includes a *revolt* against the patriarchal paradigm of philosophy (white, male, heterosexual, cisgender, able-bodied, wealthy, Western-centric, etc.).

¹⁷ It is important to remark here that we do not consider feminist metaphilosophy as separated from feminist philosophy. Just as we view metaphilosophy in general as an inquiry internal to philosophy, so we take the feminist metaphilosophical project to be internal to the feminist philosophical project. This also means that a strict separation of intentions and purposes between the 'two' is not possible (and perhaps not even useful), and that there is a continuous reciprocal circuitry. A given feminist philosophical proposal, even if it does not explicitly focus on the role and nature of philosophy, will commit «its holder[s] to a metaphilosophy that accommodates it» (Joll, *Metaphilosophy*, section 1.c). In other words, a feminist philosophical position will contain metaphilosophical aspects, reflections, and practices, having an impact on the way of doing, conceiving, and practicing philosophy.

¹⁸ J. Callahan, *Symposium: A Roundtable on Feminism and Philosophy in the Mid-1990s: Taking Stock: Introduction*, «Metaphilosophy», XXVII (1-2), 1996, pp. 184-188, p. 186.

goes along with inventive work that asks for alternative understandings of traditional philosophical concepts and for a substantial change in terms of ‘philosophical practices’ (meaning how philosophy is structured, built, and legitimized, and how the way it is practiced affects social arrangements, people’s lives, and the production of knowledge).

It is important to clarify how theoretical elaboration and anti-oppressive aims shape each other in feminist metaphilosophy. One aspect in particular should be made explicit: it is this specific anti-oppressive, ‘resistant’ intent that defines the feminist metaphilosophical contribution. In other words, it is this specific aim that has powerful metaphilosophical force and effects, since it has radical repercussions for the way philosophy is understood and exercised. The anti-oppressive question does not identify something merely thematic, in the sense that ‘oppressed groups’ and ‘the conditions of various forms of oppression’ are taken as the objects to which philosophical reflection should apply. On the contrary, the anti-oppressive question becomes a ‘trans-philosophical’ interrogation that invests how philosophy is thought, constructed, practiced, and taught.

To put it another way, the metaphilosophical contribution of the feminist philosophical project cannot be reduced simplistically to the fact that some issues are addressed in an anti-oppressive key that considers the relevance of gender (and other categories involving dehumanization, discrimination, marginalization, and oppression) in the structuring and production of knowledge and social arrangements. The feminist metaphilosophical contribution amounts to a reversal of Western philosophy and its pivotal concepts and practices.

Some specific aspects, that have already appeared throughout this introduction, seem to us of particular relevance for an understanding of the feminist metaphilosophical contribution to philosophy and its value to debates in prescriptive metaphilosophy:

1. The questioning of the philosophical canon as well as the re-elaboration of theories and conceptual tools formulated within other philosophical traditions (e.g., Spinoza’s monism, Hegel’s account of dialectic, historical materialism, phenomenology,

Foucauldian genealogical methodology, French post-structuralism, critical theory, etc.).

2. The re-discussion of problems and concepts central to philosophy. This includes the notions of ‘rationality’, ‘objectivity’, ‘truth’, ‘universality’, and ‘knowledge’, as well as the relationship between nature and culture, subject and object, and mind and body.

3. The union of critique and imagination aimed at proposing alternative ways of doing philosophy.

4. A renewed impulse to critically reflect on the relationship between philosophical theory and practice(s).

The articles in this special issue intersect in different ways and to different degrees with these four aspects, thus delving into topics and problems we have only briefly touched upon in this introduction.

4. *Overview of the Volume*

The present volume consists of contributions by invited authors (Alejandra Castillo, Kristie Dotson, Rachel Falkenstern, and Danila Suárez Tomé and Diana Maffía) and contributions selected through a call for papers and blind reviewing process (Luciana Cadahia, Michelle Ciurria, Karen Glavic, and Damiano Migliorini), in addition to the articles by the editors (Valentina Bortolami and Giovanna Miolli).

Kristie Dotson’s contribution *Metaphilosophy: A What and Why* opens this issue. Her elaboration provides an example of what we have called the union of critique and imagination for the proposal of alternative ways of doing philosophy. To this aim, Dotson deploys an approach to metaphilosophy centered on the practice of storytelling.

In *¿Es posible una recuperación de la fenomenología desde la filosofía feminista?*, Danila Suárez Tomé and Diana Maffía propose the recovery of phenomenology in a feminist key as a tool to acquire self-knowledge and emancipatory theoretical knowledge from sexual experience.

The essay *De la revuelta feminista, la historia y Julieta Kirkwood* by Alejandra Castillo deals with the oeuvre of the Chilean feminist writer Julieta Kirkwood to highlight its historiographic and knowledge aspects, outlining in particular the concept of feminist knowledge that emerges from it.

In the article *Philosophy, Feminism, and the Popular Field in Latin America*, Luciana Cadahia examines the relationship between philosophy and feminism in Latin America through the exploration of the tension between affirmative power and negative thinking. She concludes that feminism can be understood as negative and that it is necessary to recompose feminist and other anti-oppressive struggles.

Karen Glavic's contribution *La cita feminista: Nelly Richard entre feminismos, crítica cultural y filosofía chilena* interprets Nelly Richard's use of citation as a particular approach to theory bearing a feminist, affective, and desiring dimension. Richard's 'feminist citation' is presented as a space for dialogue with philosophy, history, aesthetics, visual arts, and cultural criticism. Glavic further analyzes Richard's treatment of citation by relating it to Juan Dávila's artistic work and the understanding of citation as a 'gesture' in debates on visual arts in Chile.

In *On the Uses and Abuses of Doing Feminist Philosophy with Hegel*, Rachel Falkenstern explores how metaphilosophical issues of feminist approaches to Hegel have been and are influenced by the complex interweaving of the historiography of philosophy, the philosophical canon, and historical sociopolitical forces that contribute to shaping professional practices as well as norms and definitions of philosophy.

Damiano Migliorini's article *Come nottola al tramonto: ipotesi su metodo e scopo delle future filosofie femministe* re-elaborates tools of the traditional philosophical canon. Starting from a Hegelian metaphilosophical premise, Migliorini interrogates two feminist theoretical traditions – sexual difference thought and queer theory – to advance an interpretation of the development of feminist thought as «intrinsicly open to its own destabilization and sublation».

Michelle Ciurria's essay *A New Ameliorative Approach to Moral Responsibility* rediscusses a central concept of philosophy, namely moral responsibility. She correlates three important theories of

moral responsibility with Haslanger's taxonomy of philosophical approaches to elaborate a model of moral responsibility that has anti-oppressive functions, while also highlighting the need for counterhegemonic discourses around the concept of responsibility.

Valentina Bortolami's article *On the Metaphilosophical Implications of The Naturalism Question in Feminism* considers what risks and opportunities naturalism poses for feminists. Starting from Ásta's article *The Naturalism Question in Feminism*, Bortolami highlights two problems – that of normativity of oppression and justificatory stories – and suggests that they may find satisfying responses in feminist standpoint empiricism and feminist new materialism (feminist epistemologies which have rediscussed the key concepts of naturalism, nature and science).

The articles section concludes with Giovanna Miolli's essay *Composting Contemporary Metaphilosophy with Feminist Philosophical Perspectives: Towards an Account of Philosophy's Concreteness*. Miolli considers the criticism of abstractness often leveled at philosophy and argues for the concrete character of the philosophical endeavor (and of the philosophy of philosophy itself). To this end, she advocates a composting (in the Harawayan sense) of concepts and methodologies from contemporary metaphilosophy and some feminist philosophical proposals.

The volume ends with a section of reviews devoted to publications in feminist philosophy. This issue offers reviews of: Angela Balzano's *Per farla finita con la famiglia. Dall'aborto alle parentele postumane* (by Giovanna Miolli); Rahna McKay Carusi's *Lacan and Critical Feminism Subjectivity, Sexuation, and Discourse* (by Elena Tripaldi); Denise Ferreira Da Silva's *A Dívida Impagável* (by Aléxia Bretas); Jennifer C. Nash's *Black Feminism Reimagined: After Intersectionality* (by Anna Guerini); Alison Stone's *Being Born: Birth and Philosophy* (by Silvia Locatelli); and Françoise Vergès' *The Wombs of Women: Race, Capital and Feminism* (by Sabrina Morán and María Cecilia Padilla).

Overall, this special issue constitutes only a starting point with respect to the attempt to engage in an 'explicit' consideration of the metaphilosophical value of the feminist philosophical project. We hope that this effort can further stimulate «imagination, theory,

and action»¹⁹ to make philosophy's critical self-reflection ever more radical and aware.

We wish to thank the guest contributors who accepted our invitation with enthusiasm and dedication, all the scholars who submitted an article showing their interest in this issue, the referees for their great willingness and work, and the scholars who have enriched this volume with their book reviews. A special thanks goes to Francesco Campana, Paolo Giuspoli, Armando Manchisi, and Barbara Santini for their valuable assistance in the final editing stages. We are deeply grateful to Pablo Pulgar Moya for his support throughout the publication process and for his help with language issues in Spanish. We would also like to express our sincere gratitude to Pieranna Garavaso, Luca Illetterati, and Valentina Moro, whose excellent comments helped us greatly with improving this introduction.

¹⁹ D.J. Haraway, *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene*, Durham-London, Duke University Press, 2016, p. 102.