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- C. La Rocca *Massimo Barale e la filosofia*
- E. Maragat *Not Non-Metaphysical, but just as much Metaphysical. Pippin's Hegel and the Status of Subjectivity*
- L. Mattana Ereño *Antinomia e contraddizione, tra parvenza e riflessione: la critica hegeliana a Kant intorno ai compiti della ragione*
- I. Adinolfi *«La miglior prova della miseria dell'esistenza si ricava dalla considerazione della sua magnificenza». Riflessioni sulla gloria in Søren Kierkegaard*
- F. Sanguettoli *La forma e il contenuto: la nozione di inferenza materiale nei primi saggi di Wilfrid Sellars*
- N. Rossi *L'ontologia della logica immaginaria: Aristotele e Vasil'ev a confronto*

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3 *Massimo Barale e la filosofia*

Claudio La Rocca

Essays

21 *Not Non-Metaphysical, but just as much Metaphysical. Pippin's
Hegel and the Status of Subjectivity*

Edgar Maragat

57 *Antinomia e contraddizione, tra parvenza e riflessione: la critica
hegeliana a Kant intorno ai compiti della ragione*

Leonardo Mattana Ereño

87 *«La miglior prova della miseria dell'esistenza si ricava dalla
considerazione della sua magnificenza». Riflessioni sulla gloria in
Søren Kierkegaard*

Isabella Adinolfi

115 *La forma e il contenuto: la nozione di inferenza materiale nei primi
saggi di Wilfrid Sellars*

Filippo Sanguettoli

- 147 *L'ontologia della logica immaginaria. Aristotele e Vasil'ev a confronto*
Niccolò Rossi

Discussions

- 177 *Con Hegel, oltre Hegel: sistema ed epoca in Remo Bodei*
Simone Furlani
- 203 *L'ambiguità dell'apparire nel pensiero di Jan Patočka: tre problemi*
Marco Barcaro
- 231 *La superiorità quasi giocosa della dialettica. Sull'Introduzione alla dialettica di Adorno*
Giovanni Zanotti

Book Reviews

- 261 L. Messinese, *La via della metafisica*
(Marco Ivaldo)
- 264 W. Jaeschke, *Hegels Philosophie*
(Giulia Bernard)
- 271 R. Pippin, *Hegel's Realm of Shadows. Logic as Metaphysics in 'The Science of Logic'*
(Silvia Locatelli)
- 276 M.B. Ferri (Ed.), *The Reception of Husserlian Phenomenology in North America*
(Filippo Sanguetoli)

l'ultima realizzazione dello spirito, quasi la casella mancante che sabota nel suo culmine strutturale la corrispondenza tra il sistema e questo non-commentario, ma la circolare presa in carico di una *costellazione plurale* di problemi che trova nel concetto di *spirito* uno dei suoi baricentri decisivi. È anche sulla base di tale opportunità che il presente volume costituisce un incontro irrinunciabile per chiunque desideri prendere sul serio la sfida di pensare *oltre* Hegel, accettando fino in fondo una provocazione perdurante, niente affatto nostalgica, alla nostra contemporaneità.

(Giulia Bernard)

ROBERT PIPPIN, *Hegel's Realm of Shadows. Logic as Metaphysics in 'The Science of Logic'*, Chicago-London, The University of Chicago Press, 2018, pp. 352 (ISBN: 9780226588704).

Robert Pippin's interpretation of Hegel's thought, proposed in his latest book, is part of a group of readings related to the American analytical tradition, managing to give us an image of the Stuttgart thinker as a metaphysical philosopher in a non-traditional fashion. In fact, the debate between the so-called *revised* metaphysical readings and post-Kantian readings has now made way to a new kind of research, as Kreines and Padui pointed out, addressing the question about what kind of metaphysical project Hegel had in mind, rather than whether he wanted to develop a metaphysical project or not. Being aware of this new direction of the debate, Pippin manages to give an image of an original Hegel: although Pippin's Hegel cannot be considered a metaphysical philosopher in the traditional – that is, pre-critical – sense of the term, he still turns out to be 'metaphysical' in a different way – namely, an Aristotelian and post-critical metaphysician (see p. 35).

The idea of an «unusual marriage between Kant and Aristotle in Hegel» (p. 300) represents the core of Pippin's interpretation and enables him to articulate an answer to the fundamental question posed by the book, that is the explanation of the Hegelian claim of identity between logic and metaphysics. Indeed, while touching upon different topics (such as the role of negation and contradiction in Hegel's philosophy, the self-conscious and judgmental character of thought, the

link between logic and *Realphilosophie*), the text can be summarized as revolving around the fundamental question of the relationship between logic and metaphysics, starting by the Hegelian assumption, presented in paragraph 24 of the *Encyclopedia*, according to which ‘now’ (p. 37) – after the Kantian turning point – logic can coincide with metaphysics. The clarification of this assumption seems essential to understand the essence of Hegel’s idea of a «speculative identity» (p. 6) between the forms of pure thinking and the forms of being.

To answer the question, one needs to begin with an analysis of the Kantian influence on Hegel’s thought and, at the same time, recognize Kant’s critical points that Hegel, engaged in the development of a speculative philosophy, could not accept and had to overcome. First of all, Hegel is fundamentally a post-Kantian philosopher, for he attacks the pre-critical metaphysics (in particular, the modern metaphysics of Leibniz and Spinoza) convinced that thought could express the essentiality of things. Furthermore, this post-Kantian attitude can also be found in the fact that Hegel recognizes the importance of Kantian thought in having shifted the philosophical focus from metaphysical questions to logical-epistemological questions, i.e. questions linked to the study of thought that has itself as its own object (see p. 11). However, Hegel goes beyond Kant himself (or, at least, beyond Kant as traditionally interpreted) in the development of the consequences of this criticism, since he cannot accept Kant’s distinction between things in themselves and phenomena and, therefore, the Kantian appeal to pure forms of intuition understood as a non-conceptual component necessary in the process of knowing. Indeed, in Hegel we no longer find what Pippin defines as the Kantian «two-step picture» (p. 74), that is, a view on cognition according to which the logical categories developed by thought are filled by extra-conceptual intuition, through a process in which, first of all, there is a sensible and non-conceptual reception linked to our forms of intuition, followed by a synthesis given by categorical forms. Therefore, Hegel eliminates the Kantian reference to the forms of intuition – and the «only subjective» value of the «forms of things» that they give us (p. 47) – bringing back the dynamics of the link between the forms of thought and the forms of being to a purely rational justification, that is, «within the activity of pure thinking» (p. 35).

The question concerning the forms of thought hence coincides with the question on the forms of being: reference to sensible intuitions is

no longer needed to establish the objectivity of the categories of thought, but it is thought itself that makes possible the intelligibility – and therefore the determinacy – of the forms of being. Affirming this identity makes us aware of the fact that, in the philosophical investigation, «to be is to be intelligible» (p. 185). Indeed, what we question when we think philosophically is not the mere existence of things: we question ourselves, as philosophers, about the actuality (*Wirklichkeit*), defined as the essentiality of things, as «something like the categorical essence of things, that without which they couldn't be what they are» (p. 89). The actuality is Aristotle's *energeia* (see p. 55), the intrinsic form that the thing must realize to be what it really (actually) is.

When, therefore, we unleash a logical research, that is, a research on the categories of thought (a research on the making sense of sense), we are also carrying out an ontological-metaphysical research, that is, a research on the being of things (or, on the making sense of things). In this sense, it is not difficult to understand why, according to Pippin, the difference between a general and formal logic (understood as the study of the possibilities of logical thought) and a transcendental logic (understood as the study of those categories which make it possible to know objects) is not present in Hegel: we can no longer separate a formal logic, devoid of content, and a logic which, instead, is filled by the extra-conceptual element. The study of logic is not an empty and formal study, but in the process by which thought knows itself and develops autonomously its moments, we also know what it means to be, what the essentiality of things consists of, as all that is, *is* because it is intelligible.

For Pippin, to ask ourselves the question 'How we can be sure that the whole being is knowable?' is actually inconsistent and meaningless: there is no knowledge that is, as for Kant, 'for us', and a world of being that will be closed to us since we approach being through subjective epistemic categories, as there is no longer a distinction between being and thought categories. The forms of our thought are the only way we have to account for being: everything that is, precisely is because it is intelligible, or «it is in thinking thinking thinking that thinking thinks anything that can be thought, or being» (p. 258). For Pippin, an important consequence of this view is that the philosophical work does not consist in seeking the correspondence of thought with reality, but in finding the «thought's agreement with itself» (p. 51), the returning of

the concept to itself. In fact, since being can be determined because it is made intelligible, and we can claim a speculative identity between thought and being, then the logical development in which thought comes to know itself by taking itself as object represents the same development by which we determine being.

As a consequence of these assumptions, the philosophical question is not something that can get answers from the empirical, but it is precisely an inquiry that, like for Aristotle, gives us an account of the conditions of intelligibility of the objects themselves, in that it answers the question on the essence of things. In these terms, Hegel is a metaphysician in the Aristotelian sense, because Aristotle's metaphysical question is not directed to tell us what exists, but to describe those necessary structures of the real that are at the basis of our experience of the world. In this sense, the concept of 'life' is considered by Hegel as a logical concept, since the difference between living and non-living beings cannot be derived from experience, but can be stated on a purely logical level. As Pippin points out, this does not mean that Hegel derives from logic the existence of life forms: simply, if there is a world, there must be, logically, a distinction between what is mechanically explainable and the organically organized living beings (see pp. 273-274). From here the title of the book becomes clear: Hegelian logic can be considered formal not in the Kantian empty sense, but in the sense of its being a «science *of form*» (p. 15), and therefore a science that presents that realm of shadows – 'living' shadows – that underlies all our understanding of reality.

Starting from this fundamental claim, which makes up the core of the book, Pippin addresses many other issues. In the first two chapters is presented the thesis summarized above, from which follows the equation, presented in Chapter 3, between the Kantian transcendental apperception and the Concept, considered as the «most general term for the basic bearer of truth, judgement» (p. 38), and understood as «the fully developed (self-developed) self-consciousness of pure thinking about itself» (p. 103). Moreover, the concepts derive their determination according to their use, i.e., their role in possible judgments. This implies that each concept involves «normative properties» (p. 137), mainly the negation (object of Chapter 4) of all that is inconsistent with it: this represents the primary engine of logical movement. In the second part of the book, Pippin applies the

awareness derived from the first part, to offer an exegesis of the *Science of Logic*. After dealing with objective logic (*Doctrine of Being* in Chapter 5, *Doctrine of Essence* in Chapter 6), Hegel shows how the transition from this to subjective logic, i.e. to the *Doctrine of the Concept*, occurs when the first part has shown that the truth of the object is the concept (p. 251). In Chapter 7, Pippin presents the link between concept and life, understanding the latter as that fundamental dynamic of the movement in which the concept has itself as its object. In Chapter 8, from the identity of logic and metaphysics, Pippin derives the formulation of life as a logical concept. In the concluding chapter, Pippin outlines the identity between the idea of True and the idea of Good, also analyzing the essential passage from logic to *Realphilosophie*.

A very interesting aspect, which should be further developed and deepened, is presented by Pippin in the last pages of his work. This aspect consists in the analysis of the problematic relationship between Hegel's logic and *Realphilosophie*. Here, Pippin does not want to fall into any kind of impositivism or transcendentalism: his objective consists in sustaining that the spheres of Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit depend «in some way on a non derived conceptual structure manifested in its pure form in the *SL*» (p. 319), but avoiding to understand the relationship between logic and *Realphilosophie* according to a form-content dynamic. Pippin solves this problem by stating that in the *Science of Logic* the concrete possibility to determine any empirical content is presented, but without trying to determine, *a priori*, the nature of that content. Simply, the content found empirically cannot be understood separately from our conceptual structures: the experienced content will therefore be inseparable from its form, a «logical form now understood as inflected by attention to what is other than pure thought and to action in the world» (p. 320). Therefore, a fundamental point for Pippin is to underline that the categories of the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit are the same categories found *a priori* in the *Science of Logic*, though developed in a way that reflects the domain of nature and spirit.

It would be interesting, on Pippin's part, a greater clarity on this inflection that the logical categories undergo in Hegel's *Realphilosophie*. In fact, another interesting argument, that Pippin develops in the last reflections of the book, consists in stating that, if on the one hand, dealing with pure concepts «the formal determinateness of any such

content is *identical* with conceptual determinacy», on the other hand «there is a plenty of room for the exploration of an unknown empirical and finite world, that ‘realm of darkness’» (p. 320). It seems therefore that Pippin leaves open the possibility for empirical research, that get in touch with the finite world, to have, in the *Realphilosophie*, some kind of scientific and philosophical value. Thus, it would be interesting to understand how, for Pippin, the logical categories of the world of shadow are modified according to the *Realphilosophie* spheres in which they develop, and to understand above all the role played in this inflation by the discoveries of the empirical sciences. This would mean that, alongside the Hegel convinced that the concept in its pure form belongs to the *Science of Logic*, one could also recognize a Hegel aware of the «incompleteness» (p. 321) – also suggested by Pippin from the title of his book – of a philosophical thought that does not try to address the problem of the extralogical.

Pippin’s work could therefore find future developments in very lively themes of the current Hegelian debate. On one side, in the debate that analyse the relationship between *a priori* and *a posteriori* in the formation of the categories of Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit; on the other, in the one concerning the relationship between logic and empirical sciences – a problem of fundamental importance to Hegel, as one could see in his Philosophy of Nature.

(Silvia Locatelli)

MICHELA B. FERRI (ed.), *The Reception of Husserlian Phenomenology in North America*, New York, Springer, 2019, pp. 482 (ISBN: 9783319991856).

Già da alcuni anni si è potuta apprezzare la pubblicazione di vari studi volti a mettere in discussione l’incompatibilità, un tempo assodata, fra fenomenologia e filosofia anglo-americana. Mancava però una monografia che avesse come suo esplicito tema la ricostruzione della ricezione della fenomenologia negli Stati Uniti. Il testo edito da Michela Ferri si concentra a questo proposito sulla ricezione della filosofia di Husserl e la utilizza per organizzare e studiare i rapporti della fenomenologia con la filosofia americana. La struttura del libro esprime