
Does History Make Sense? is both an unexpected and an expected book.

On the one hand, the volume is dedicated to a part of Hegel’s philosophy, namely his philosophy of history, which was more or less unanimously considered the least appealing and most outdated part of Hegel’s thought, and which has been prevalently neglected by recent and not-so recent scholarship. On the other hand, it should not be surprising that a book on Hegel’s conception of history had to come from a neo-pragmatist interpreter¹, and from Terry Pinkard especially.

History has in fact been at the center of both Pinkard’s interpretation of Hegel and of prevalent criticism on all neo-pragmatist readings². Thus, even if Does History Make Sense could also be seen as eventually opening a season of renewed interest in ‘forgotten’ (even ‘forbidden’) aspects of Hegel’s thought, a confrontation with Hegel’s philosophy of history appears logical in the context of Pinkard’s work.

Already in his Hegel’s Phenomenology: the Sociality of Reason³, Pinkard claimed that it would not be possible to provide a ‘normative’ reading of Geist without discussing its historical evolution: norms have a history, outside of which no individual is found fully formed, as an ‘external’ creator of norms, and therefore change in norms can only be understood with retrospective reference to past social spaces. Consequently, Pinkard read the Phenomenology as carrying out the double project of


providing a normative interpretation of human rationality on the one hand, and of building a retrospective understanding of the present social space based on those normative premises on the other.

Pinkard’s *Does History Make Sense?*, written in Pinkard’s signature ‘commentary’ style, brings this twofold aim to bear on the totality of Hegel’s project. Just as the latter, the book could be divided in two: Chapters 1, 2 and 5 present Hegel’s normative understanding of what Pinkard calls ‘human mindedness’, that is, human rationality, while Chapters 3 and 4 present a step-by-step analysis of Hegel’s narrative of world history, considered as only a case study for the application of the normative understanding of human rationality presented in the other chapters.

Pinkard highlights that Hegel’s narrative of world history, just as the one from the *Phenomenology*, only presents the genealogical, retrospective assessment of one social space, of one normative framework, which is the one defined by the European ideal of freedom. Further, it is on this point that, according to Pinkard, Hegel failed to meet his own standards, confusing that specific and historical ideal with the more general notion of reconciliation, and therefore seeing the completion of European modernity as the only aim of world history.

Pinkard’s scope in the book seems then to take on his long-established, ‘historical’ characterization of normativity, in order to suggest a ‘Hegelian alternative’ to Hegel’s philosophy of history itself, claiming that many different possibilities of reconciliation beyond the realization of European freedom are left open by Hegel’s normative understanding of human rationality and social space, even though Hegel did not quite realize the pluralistic potential of his normative intuition.

Chapters 1, 2 are dedicated to the outline of just this intuition, with a special focus on the *Science of Logic* and on the *Phenomenology*, while in chapter 5 its relation to Hegel’s Eurocentric narrative and its contemporary viability are explored.

The core of Pinkard’s argument is presented in these chapters. The claim for the necessity of including a historical dimension in the definition of norms remains unchanged and anchored to a non-psychological understanding of recognition, which in *Does History Make Sense?* is presented using Michael Thompson’s distinction between monadic and dyadic judgments. This reformulation allows Pinkard to suggest an untraditional reading of recognition, in which master and slave
would not be fighting over their status as rational subjects (the mutual concession of which seems the precondition for the fight’s unfolding, rather than its scope), but over their different approaches to the normative space itself. The master relates to his normative framework in monadic terms, that is, he has a game-like conception of the social space, according to which his moves within it would be defined with exclusive reference to a pre-established set of rules. Consequently, other subjects in the game would be seen only instrumentally, as subordinated to the same set of rules, but not as active participants in their determination. Further, while the ‘match’ would be historically situated, the rules of the game would not⁴.

According to Pinkard, the master and slave dialectic shows how problematic this reading is in the long run, establishing the truth of the dyadic approach to the normative, which is instanced by the slave’s position instead. In forcibly accepting a set of rules, which he initially does not recognize as his own, the slave is put in the position of understanding the true nature of the normative space, which is ‘objective’ insofar as it is not determined by a subject owning ‘authority’ over it, but is instead the source of the determination of all authorities within all contingent social spaces.

According to Pinkard, the dyadic perspective on recognition not only shows the historicity of norms in terms of the contingency of social spaces (in which authority is not fixed by correspondence to some ‘eternal’ norms), but it also unveils a direction in their history. In this sense, different social spaces would all tend towards the same shared ideal aim, which is reaching the extension of the dyadic perspective to all their members and institutions, recognizing the ultimate authority to the ‘space of reasons’ itself, and not to one perspective within it over

⁴ Even though this is not explicitly claimed in the book, it is not hard to see behind the ‘monadic’ understanding of normativity Brandom’s version of recognition, which Pinkard already had criticized in the past. See for instance Soggetti, Oggetti, Normatività: Che cosa significa essere un agente?, in L. Ruggiu and I. Testa (a cura di), Hegel Contemporaneo. La ricezione americana di Hegel a confronto con la tradizione europea, Guerini, Milano 2003, pp. 139-166 and Was Pragmatism the Successor of Idealism? In C.J. Misak, (ed.), New Pragmatisms, Oxford University Press, Oxford – New York 2007 p. 166. For a general discussion of the quarrell, see L. Corti, Ritratti Hegeliani. Un capitolo della filosofia americana contemporanea, Carocci, Roma 2014.
others. This would be the meaning, according to Pinkard, of ‘eternal justice’ in Hegel, whose realization in history would coincide with the realization of a reconciled shape of life, in which all wills are harmonized within an institutional framework, insofar as the accomplishment of all the different ideals of self-realization is made possible within it at one moment in history. It is this very ideal, which Hegel wrongly made coincide with its one instantiation in the European ideal of freedom, which is the driving force of history: normative frameworks and social spaces need to be measured up to their ideal of reconciliation, and need to be updated whenever tensions within their reconciled forms arise, showing them to be not as reconciled as it seemed.

The biggest novelty in the book is the attempt to link this reading, otherwise entirely staged within the Phenomenology, to an equally untraditional reading of Hegel’s notion of ‘idea’ in the Science of Logic. The aim would this time be connected to Pinkard’s claim in his most recent book Hegel’s Naturalism: Mind, Nature and the Final Ends of Life5, which tried to bridge the traditional divide between the natural and the normative dimension, presenting a ‘naturalized’ interpretation of human normative activity as more complex than, but continuous with, other forms of normativity which Hegel would trace in nature. On this reading, the complexity of the human normative space would only be determined by a feature, which humans have in addition to the one of purposiveness, which they instead share with other animals. This feature is awareness, humans’ ability not only to act on reasons, but also to be aware of their reasons as reasons.

Pinkard understands the category of the ‘idea’ in the logic as presenting just this structure, showing how this is connected with the self-reflexive act in which the subject becomes conscious of itself as subject. In this sense, the structure presented in the ‘Idea’ would be the same as the one of recognition. The passage from the Logic has the function of avoiding possible historicist misunderstandings of Pinkard’s reading: the necessarily historical and developmental, genealogic nature of the normative dimension of human life does not make it any more ‘subjective’ or ‘arbitrary’, but is instead a consequence of human nature itself,

and is therefore ‘objective’, insofar as it is referred to purposes that are posed by nature to subjects, and not by subjects on nature.

*Does History Make Sense?* is an example of proficient and devoted research: well-read, carefully informative and rich of insights also beyond Hegel’s text. It will certainly be of interests for all readers concerned with neo-pragmatism, neo-pragmatist interpretations of Hegel, as well as for more ‘traditional’ Hegel scholars, despite its resting on a peculiar assessment of the *Science of Logic* and on consistent reference to the *Phenomenology* in order to explain systematic works, which are both still considered highly debatable within Hegelian scholarship. Pinkard’s book has the merit of drawing attention on problems, such as *Geist*’s relation to history, as well as the Idea’s relationship with time, which play a momentous role in Hegel’s project, and which yet risk to be neglected, due to the ostracism which, for commendable reasons, Hegel’s philosophy of history has been put.

(Elena Tripaldi)


Il testo si articola in sette capitoli, preceduti da una breve ma pregnante introduzione che definisce l’obiettivo, audace quanto arduo da raggiungere, del volume: il «tentativo di una comprensione nuova e innovativa delle *Grundlinien* dal punto di vista della loro persistente attualità» (p. 15), eliminando i «vuoti cliché e le noiose leggende» a favore della «rinascita del pensiero chiaro come il sole della autodeterminazione e della libertà» (p. 16). In un’epoca che rappresenta quasi la contraddizione di se stessa perseguendo una logica della crescita che si rivela alla fine una *non-logica* (p. 13), con conseguenze come la